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THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN THE GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE FIRMS 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that it is crucial to take account of both home and host country contexts in 
order adequately to understand their implications for Chinese enterprises investing into 
foreign countries. This calls for an analysis that is sensitive to both home and host country 
contexts, and that takes into account how the institutions and political systems in those 
contexts establish institutional and resource capital needs for the overseas-investing firm.  We 
discuss and illustrate three different conjunctions of Chinese and host country characteristics, 
and the firm-level learning and adaptation required in the light of the relevant capitals likely 
to be available to Chinese firms.  The analysis draws upon insights from resource-based, 
institutional and political perspectives.  While it is developed with specific reference to 
China, we also suggest that this form of analysis can be applied more generally to the 
implementation of outward foreign direct investment from any country.  
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THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN THE GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE FIRMS 
The rapid expansion of outward foreign direct investment [OFDI] from China has been a new 
and significant development in international business during the past decade. The rise in 
China’s OFDI was particularly marked after 2005 as its ‘go global’ strategy was consolidated 
and government restrictions were progressively eased to ensure political support for OFDI 
(Salidjanova, 2011).  It expanded from an annual flow of under US$100 million in the 1980s 
to approximately US$10 billion by 2005, surging to US$84 billion by 2012 (UNCTAD, 
2013). Even in 2010, when global OFDI levels fell dramatically as a result of the financial 
crisis, Chinese non-financial OFDI recorded a year-on-year increase of 25.9%.  It represented 
5.1% of global OFDI flows placing the country as the 5th largest provider of OFDI in the 
world (MOFCOM, 2011; Peoples’ Bank of China, 2011; The Heritage Foundation, 2012). By 
2012 Chinese OFDI stock had reached an estimated US$509 billion (UNCTAD, 2013).  
The marked increase in China’s OFDI has understandably attracted growing attention 
among both academics and politicians.  It raises a number of important theoretical and policy 
issues.  To date, more attention has been given to the motives behind Chinese OFDI than to 
how it is negotiated and implemented in different host country contexts (e.g. Buckley et al., 
2007).  China has been seen to qualify, even challenge, the conventional analysis that the 
internationalization of firms is motivated by opportunities to capitalize on ownership, 
location and internalization (OLI) advantages.  It has been asked whether we need an 
alternative analysis that is better suited to emerging economies in which firms may not 
possess such advantages (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Dunning, 2006; Mathews, 2006; Narula, 
2006; Rugman, 2009; Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; Boston Consulting Group, 2011; Marinov 
and Marinova, 2011). 
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One reason why China can be regarded as a different case concerns the suspicion that the 
motives for its overseas investment are informed by a political agenda.  The heavy state 
guidance of much Chinese OFDI suggests that it is an orchestrated arm of the country’s 
foreign policy, motivated by the country’s strategic interests (Zhang, Zhou & Ebbers, 2010; 
Luo, Xue & Hun, 2010).  The assumption that this is the case has led to opposition to Chinese 
acquisitions in Australia and the United States (Scott, 2009; Hanemann & Rosen, 2011) and 
to debate over the motives for, and impact of, Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa (Van 
Dijk, 2009; Brautigam, 2010).  In this way, the motives for Chinese OFDI connect to both its 
home and host country contexts. 
It is the contention of, and justification for, this paper that it is crucial to take account of 
both home and host country contexts in order adequately to understand their implications for 
Chinese enterprises investing into foreign countries. The extent to which the 
internationalization of Chinese firms has been assisted by support from their home context, as 
well as their capacity to adjust to conditions in their host contexts deserves closer attention 
than they have received so far.  It is our aim to propose a framework that develops this 
analysis and also to indicate how it can enhance our understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages attending Chinese OFDI as well as the contingent adjustments that foreign 
investing Chinese firms may have to make.  We believe that such a framework could have 
wider relevance, especially for OFDI from other emerging economies characterized by strong 
government intervention.  
There are several requirements to meet this aim and these give rise to the sections that 
follow.  The first requirement is for a more refined conceptualization of ‘context’ than has 
generally been employed in international business analysis. The key aspects of home and host 
country contexts relevant to internationalization need to be identified.  For a more adequate 
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understanding of context, a socio-political perspective has to be added to the economic one 
prevailing in the literature. This perspective would help highlight the significance of 
institutional and political aspects of country context.  It would assist our appreciation of the 
contrasting characteristics of business systems in different contexts.  For example, much 
western-informed international business literature differentiates between business and 
government, or the firm and the country levels of analysis.  This distinction is far less tenable 
in a context such as China, soon to become the world’s largest economy. The active 
involvement of the Chinese state in firm internationalization policy, and its associated 
support can extend to bilateral agreements on host country conditions for Chinese firms of a 
kind that would be alien to western countries.  Such agreements can stabilize host country 
environments, and offer incoming firms exemptions from employment and tax regulations 
and other privileges. 
Having incorporated the institutional and political dimensions of country context, a 
second requirement is that account be taken of both home and host country contexts together, 
giving attention to the implications of different conjunctions of the two that are created by 
variations in host country conditions. Most existing literature on internationalization fails to 
consider the combined implications of home and host country contexts.  It is the conjunction 
of home and host country-specific advantages and disadvantages (CSAs and CSDs) that 
define the conditions under which firms internationalize (Rugman and Li, 2007). These 
conditions determine the human and other resources that are available in their domestic and 
host contexts as well as the institutional capital available to the firms.  
A third requirement therefore is to apply an essentially resource-based view of the firm 
to identify the resource capital and institutional capital required for successful OFDI and 
whether these can be supplied from the home or host country context.  Resource capital in the 
context of internationalization refers to the value-enhancing assets and competencies that a 
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firm requires for successful operation in a foreign host country. It includes the staffing of its 
foreign operations and the practices it follows in them.  Institutional capital refers to the 
ability to accommodate to and/or manage relations with domestic and foreign institutions in 
ways that also enhance international performance (Oliver, 1997). Our use of the term 
‘capital’ will be with reference to these two concepts.   
The motives for OFDI are relevant to this issue, particularly whether internationalization 
is motivated primarily by asset-seeking or by opportunities for asset-exploitation in customer-
driven markets.  If the former, as with OFDI into primary industries, the resource capital 
required will be primarily that for achieving ‘exploitation’ - operating existing technologies 
and managing local labor (March, 1991).   If the latter, then the ability to ‘explore’ may be 
required, including acquiring an understanding of local markets and possibly innovating to 
suit local expectations. Competence in managing global value-chains may also be necessary.  
The general question that arises is whether the resource and institutional capitals to support 
OFDI by Chinese firms are available from domestic sources or have to be secured from the 
host country.  Again, this means that account needs to be taken of both home and host 
country contexts.  
The nub of our argument, in short, is that the globalization of Chinese firms calls for an 
analysis that is sensitive to both home and host country contexts, and that takes into account 
how the institutions and political systems in those contexts establish requirements for  
institutional and resource capital on the part of the overseas-investing firm.  It is therefore 
necessary to consider the implications for successful Chinese OFDI of different conjunctions 
of home and host country characteristics.  A basic representation of this argument is given in 
Figure 1.  It draws upon insights from resource-based, institutional and political perspectives.  
While we now develop the argument with specific reference to China, we also suggest that it 
can be applied more generally to the implementation of OFDI from any country.  
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Figure 1.  Basic representation of the argument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country context – China and OFDI host countries 
There is considerable variation in the geographical destinations of Chinese OFDI as well as in 
its industry distribution. It is widely dispersed and truly globalized: in 2011 there were 
Chinese foreign investments in 178 countries or territories, including Hong Kong and Macau 
(MOFCOM, 2012). By far the largest stock of OFDI has officially gone to Hong Kong, but a 
substantial amount of that is suspected to be ‘round-tripping’.  If we exclude Hong Kong, 
Macau and tax havens, the stock of Chinese OFDI was, as of 2012, distributed primarily 
among the following host locations: Australia, Singapore, Canada, the Central Asian 
republics, European Union, Russia, Nigeria, Iran, Brazil and the USA. Sub-Saharan Africa 
accounted for a relatively small but fast growing stock of Chinese OFDI. While some high 
profile Chinese overseas investments have attracted media attention, the typical pattern is of 
investments of less than US$10 million.  Acquisition of local companies is the most common 
vehicle for Chinese OFDI (Luo & Tung, 2007; Li, 2007; MOFCOM, 2012). Although 
China’s OFDI stock is heavily weighted towards developed countries, it is also growing in 
certain emerging economies, which are rich in natural resources and which in some cases like 
Brazil and South Africa also offer sizable domestic markets.   
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China’s OFDI stock is spread across many industries.  The largest portion is in business 
services mainly helping to promote the export of Chinese goods.  The energy sector accounts 
for the next largest portion, followed by the extractive, transportation and manufacturing 
sectors (MOFCOM, 2011, The Heritage Foundation, 2012).  Different sectors require 
different types and levels of skill and managerial expertise, the limited availability of which 
in some host countries can present an adaptation problem for Chinese investing firms.  The 
combination of host country context and industry is therefore likely to be of considerable 
operational relevance.  
Most of the country’s OFDI has been made by state-owned enterprises [SOEs] which 
remain a major component of China’s “centrally managed capitalism” (Lin, 2010) or 
“network capitalism” (Boisot & Child, 1996).  Foreign investment by Chinese SOEs is 
accompanied by heavy government involvement intended to ensure that foreign investments 
in so-called ‘strategic’ industries will be aligned to the country’s long-term development 
policies (Salidjanova, 2012).  The proportion of OFDI made by SOEs stands officially at 68 
percent of the total, though the definition of an SOE is not always precise and the exact 
proportion of OFDI made by non-state enterprises is not known.  The Chinese government’s 
‘going-out’ strategy has been directed primarily at SOEs, and provides for simplified 
approval processes, tax relief, favorable exchange rates, low-interest loans, subsidized 
insurance for expatriates, and advice on host country conditions (Luo et al., 2010). The 
ownership status of Chinese overseas-investing firms is significant because it is associated 
with a different level of support and protection from the home government. The relevance of 
home context for Chinese OFDI is therefore conditional on the ownership of the 
internationalizing firm. In addition to the specific supports for Chinese OFDI, government-to-
government agreements can stabilize operating conditions for Chinese firms in a risky foreign 
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environment through inter-state bilateral economic agreements or aid arrangements. Again 
these benefits are more likely to be made available to SOEs. 
The variation in the destinations of Chinese OFDI and its spread across different sectors 
and categories of firm ownership thus needs to be taken into account because it has potential 
implications for the host country conditions that Chinese firms experience, for the extent of 
support they are likely to receive from their home government, for the challenges they are 
likely to face in their foreign operations, and for the competencies required to meet such 
challenges.  In particular, the wide range of host countries for China’s OFDI brings different 
contextual conditions into play. 
 
The analysis of context 
This leads onto the question how to analyze country context in a way that is theoretically 
relevant for OFDI. The point of departure for developing analytical sensitivity to ‘context’ is 
how to conceptualize it.  Context is defined in common parlance as ‘the circumstances that 
form the setting for an action, event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully 
understood’ (Oxford Online Dictionary). The danger is that such a broad concept can mean 
all things to all people, especially if they approach the subject through the lenses of different 
disciplines.  It is suggested here that two aspects of country context are particularly relevant 
for OFDI: the political stability of the country and its institutional maturity. 
Political instability, especially in host countries, has often been regarded as harmful to 
OFDI insofar as it introduces additional uncertainty and risk (e.g. Lucas, 1990). While 
‘political stability’ is a concept that we frequently employ in everyday discourse, its precise 
definition and measurement is not so straightforward (Ake, 1975).  Ake suggests that political 
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instability can be assessed as the proportion of actors in a political population who violate the 
existing system of political exchange. The World Bank bases its assessments of ‘political 
stability and absence of violence’ on perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence 
and terrorism (World Bank, 2011). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘Political Instability 
Index’ is based on four factors that have been found to predict social and political unrest 
(EIU, 2009). These are the level of development; extreme cases of economic or political 
discrimination against minorities; the presence of neighbourhoods that have suffered violent 
conflicts; and ‘intermediate regimes’ (those that are neither consolidated democracies nor 
autocratic regimes combined with the existence in these regimes of intense factionalism in 
domestic politics). The last criterion recalls the fact that political stability does not necessarily 
equate with the degree of democracy prevailing in a country. Indeed, comparative evidence 
suggests that stable autocratic regimes pose no more threat in terms of expropriating foreign 
investment in their countries than do democracies that are relatively unstable (Li, 2009). For 
present purposes a country’s political stability can be said to be greater if its governance 
system enjoys popular legitimacy, if changes in government are orderly, and if the policies of 
different governments exhibit substantial continuity.   
Institutional maturity refers to a situation in which a country’s institutions, such as its 
legal system and regulatory authorities, function in a transparent manner, adhering to clear 
rules that are applied in a universalistic manner to all citizens.  While mature institutions are 
subject to legislated change, they are protected from behind-the-scenes political interference.  
Another indication of institutional maturity is that institutional agencies function efficiently 
and without undue bureaucratic obfuscation. The World Bank’s annual country ranking of 
‘Ease of Doing Business’ in terms of ten indicators provides an indirect assessment of 
institutional maturity (World Bank, 2012). The indicators cover matters such as ease of 
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starting a new business, registering a business, obtaining credit, enforcing contracts, 
protecting investment, paying taxes and closing a business. The World Bank assessment 
indicates that from the point of view of business, the developed economies of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are institutionally the most 
mature, while those of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are the least. 
While they may impact on each other, political stability and institutional maturity are not 
the same phenomena.  They may tend in the long term to go together in a complementary 
manner, so that political stability gives scope for more adequate institutional arrangements to 
be enacted while institutional maturity can help stabilize political governance by encouraging 
inclusiveness and non-discrimination.  This is because the interaction of the two phenomena 
largely accord with the positive relation between the codification and diffusion of information 
(Boisot, 1986).  Institutional maturity is normally manifest in a high level of codification of 
the rules of public and social behavior which facilitates their wide and universally-based 
application through a society (high diffusion).  The high diffusion of social rules should help 
secure a broadly-based legitimacy for political power and hence increase political stability.  
However, even if political stability and institutional maturity are complementary in the long 
term (which is one of the justifications advanced for democracy), there are situations in 
which they do not go together.  Thus, mature institutions can, at least for some time, maintain 
an orderly business environment in a country that is experiencing political instability in terms 
of a frequent turnover of governments, examples being the French Fourth Republic and more 
recently Belgium.  Equally, if political stability is based on the presence of an autocratic 
regime, this may inhibit maturity in the country’s institutions. For this reason, it is 
appropriate to treat the two features separately. This gives rise to the four combinations 
shown in Figure 2, which offers a comparative framework. 
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      Figure 2. Countries categorized according to their political stability  
                      and institutional maturity  
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Africa 
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 Sub‐Saharan Africa 
 
 
    Institutional Maturity  
 
Political 
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Adapted from Rodrigues (2010)
      An analysis informed by the identification of political stability and institutional maturity 
offers a potentially useful tool for understanding the nature and significance for Chinese 
foreign-investing firms of contrasts between home and host country contexts.  Country 
differences are realities that such firms have to address.  Sometimes they create risk for 
OFDI; other times they lead to entry barriers.  Thus political instability and institutional 
immaturity in host countries tend to present high levels of risk, although many may be 
receptive to inward FDI.  By contrast, some politically stable and institutionally mature 
countries may erect barriers to Chinese OFDI driven by domestic political pressures arising 
through highly developed systems for expressing local interests.  The extent and nature of the 
inter-country difference also carries implications for the competencies and knowledge 
required to meet the challenges that arise. If these competencies are available to firms, the 
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impact of country-specific factors may be moderated by firm-specific ones (Marinova, Child 
& Marinov, 2012). 
As the home context for OFDI, we would classify China into category B of Figure 2.  
This classification is more contentious for political stability than it is for institutional 
maturity.  China scored only 24 out of a possible 100 for the year 2010 on the World Bank’s 
‘political stability and absence of violence’ index. This suggests that China is a country that 
has low political stability.  Certainly, tensions remain between reformers and conservatives 
within the ruling communist party, and the authorities continue to fear social unrest.  On the 
other hand, despite the turmoil of 1989, China has enjoyed a long period of political 
continuity since the mid-1970s, and it has also achieved a peaceful mode of leadership 
succession (Harding, 2011).  Although the regime depends on pervasive control by the 
Communist Party, this mode of governance does not transgress traditional Confucian values 
and it has in the past two decades enjoyed substantial popular acceptance.  
China ranked 91 out of 185 on the World Bank’s 2012 ‘Ease of Doing Business’ 
assessment which denotes limited institutional maturity. The country’s institutional 
immaturity arises partly from the continuing tendency for the application of institutional rules 
to be subject to political criteria and active interference by government and party officials.  It 
also reflects a shortage of professional personnel to implement laws and regulations.   
This home country environment has important implications for the globalization of 
Chinese firms. Government policies are supportive of OFDI, and can be relied upon so long 
as the foreign investment projects accord with national strategic priorities which privilege 
certain industries and host countries.   If OFDI projects meet government criteria, assistance 
is made available to firms in the form of low-cost finance, diplomatic support overseas, and 
(where required) business services from other Chinese firms operating the foreign territory 
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(Luo, Xue & Han, 2010). These are potentially significant CSAs especially in host country 
environments that lack intermediate markets and other resources and/or which are politically 
unstable.  In other environments such as the United States, the close association of large 
SOEs with the Chinese government has furnished a political excuse to deny Chinese firms 
opportunities for market entry through the acquisition of local companies.  In the latter case, 
China as the home country creates CSDs for globalizing firms. The high transaction costs that 
domestic institutions create for Chinese firms has also been argued to be a CSD that 
motivates such firms to move or expand to foreign environments (Witt & Lewin, 2007). 
Our argument is that it is the combinations of home and host country contexts that are 
particularly consequential for Chinese OFDI and we can now examine such combinations in 
terms of the categories identified in Figure 2.  Category C in the figure is a rare combination, 
arguably illustrated by the unusual linguistically fractured case of Belgium, and it will 
therefore not be addressed further. We start with the United States, which clearly falls into 
category A of the figure, as a host country context for Chinese OFDI. Other host countries 
falling into the same category include Australia, Canada and the north European members of 
the EU.   
When the host country for Chinese firms is in category A, its home context can be 
disadvantageous for several reasons.  First, China as the home base of investing firms 
generates opposition on grounds of its lack of transparency and suspected state manipulation 
which host-country opponents of the investment claim constitute violations of their country’s 
institutional norms. Another pretext for opposition in the USA to Chinese OFDI lies in 
China’s own diminishing openness to inward foreign investment and its new framework for 
subjecting inward investment to national security screening (Hanemann, 2011).  Moreover, 
the openness of the political system in the United States makes it easier for opposition to be 
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mobilized and more difficult for confidential inter-governmental understandings facilitating 
foreign investment to be reached.  For example, Huawei has been trying to expand in the US 
since 2008 and has been thwarted repeatedly as US lawmakers raised opposition about 
security risks from the Chinese company.  In early 2011, Huawei withdrew its purchase of 
California-based 3Leaf Systems patents, in compliance with a recommendation by the US 
Committee on Foreign Investment. Prior to this, Huawei failed in bids to acquire other 
companies including the 3Com Corp in 2008 and 2Wire and Motorola's wireless business in 
2010.  Political opponents of Huawei’s planned acquisitions of American firms claim that the 
company has close ties with the Chinese military, receives financial support from the Chinese 
government, and poses a threat to national security.  In October 2012, the US House 
Intelligence Committee urged that American companies should not do business with Huawei, 
and a smaller Chinese telecoms equipment company ZTE, and that these companies should 
not be permitted to acquire or merge with American firms on the grounds that their links to 
the Chinese government pose a national security risk (US House of Representatives, 2012). 
Another obstacle facing Chinese firms seeking to invest in category A host contexts is 
that, by and large, Chinese executives are not familiar with how to act in a highly 
sophisticated market and mature institutional system.  The modes of lobbying and public 
relations that are institutionally accepted in such countries (Barley, 2010), contrast markedly 
with those operating in China.  
In view of these issues thrown up by the combination of China (category B) and the 
United States (category A) as respectively home and host contexts for Chinese OFDI, Karl 
Sauvant (2011) of the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment has 
identified the requirements for such OFDI to be more acceptable in the USA and other 
category A countries. First, China must develop and enforce greater standards of transparency 
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both for its SOE sector and for privately-owned businesses.  The issue here is that China’s 
regulations and legal frameworks are not at present compatible with the desire of Chinese 
multinationals to operating in the United States and other OECD economies.  In Sauvant’s 
words, ‘the country must develop and enforce greater standards of transparency both for its 
SOE sector, but also for privately owned businesses. Doing so would help answer questions 
which range from what sort of influence the Communist Party has on procurement policy and 
technology transfer, to more easily addressed questions over whether accounting standards 
are being held to international standards’. 
Second, executives in Chinese firms have to become more cognizant of the cultural 
expectations that prevail in such host environments. Thus, ‘Chinese firms need to internalize 
the subjective standards that come with operating in a foreign culture…how you do business, 
how you get permission to do certain things.  Chinese executives need to understand how you 
behave in a highly sophisticated market with established institutional systems like those in 
the US’. Third, Chinese investors need to be educated on how to navigate the corridors of 
power in Washington. This would help them assess realistically whether proposed Chinese 
OFDI projects in the USA will be politically acceptable. 
Host countries located in category B of Figure 2 are like China characterized by a 
relatively high level of political stability combined with relatively low institutional maturity. 
Economic relations in such countries are highly embedded in the political system and are 
informed by political objectives. Government intervention in business is high and not 
transparent. While laws and regulations have been enacted that may formally conform to high 
international standards, their local interpretation and implementation is often opaque and 
subject to behind-the-scenes arrangements. 
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When the host country for Chinese OFDI is located in category B of Figure 2, its home 
context (China) is advantageous because of the similarity in the two countries’ political and 
institutional systems. This reduces the learning that Chinese firms require to build 
institutional capital in those countries, especially in terms of how to relate to less democratic 
governments.  In addition, understandings are often reached between the Chinese and host 
governments, sometimes backed by substantial Chinese monetary aid, which lead to local 
institutional regulations being ‘accommodated’ to the requirements of Chinese investing 
firms.  The understandings are reached with relatively stable and centralized regimes and as a 
result they can be relied upon over the time-period of the investment.  
Kazakhstan provides an example of the benefits to Chinese OFDI of the similarity of 
many features as between the home and host context. Chinese ODFI to that country has 
grown rapidly since 2000 – totaling some US$13billion by 2012 (Tengri News, 2012). While 
the oil and mineral resources of Kazakhstan provide a material incentive for Chinese 
investment, the country’s political and institutional context also assists its implementation.  
Kazakhstan has had the same political regime since its independence in December 1991 
which denotes high stability.  The country’s institutions continue to be less than fully mature 
in terms of their transparency and universalism, although its periodic elections have over time 
have moved closer to international standards, and its World Bank rankings in terms of ease of 
doing business have steadily improved.   
O’Neill (2009) has described the significance for Chinese OFDI of this relatively 
favorable host country political and institutional context as follows:   
‘Chinese government policies, both financial incentives for Chinese firms as well as 
loans for the Kazakh government, push state owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest 
there…these policies provide protection for Chinese SOEs given the weak rule of law 
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and high corruption in Kazakhstan…Chinese foreign aid constrains Kazakh leaders from 
acting against the interests of Chinese firms…foreign aid buys the support of the Kazakh 
leadership for Chinese investments by creating a win-win status quo for both 
governments. The Chinese government secures access to much needed resources and 
potential profits for Chinese state owned firms. The Kazakh government receives 
financial resources from China that leaders can use to provide public goods for the 
people of Kazakhstan or private goods for key members of the government and their 
families and supporters. These resources are especially welcome at present given the 
economic downturn stemming from the global financial crisis.’  
 
Most sub-Saharan African countries fall into category D of Figure 2.  Countries in this 
category are characterized by economic relations that are deeply embedded in political 
relations and are often shaped by personal or factional (sometimes tribal) objectives. Their 
political regimes are in many cases fragile and unstable. Decisions on business-related 
matters are frequently made though personal and secret channels, often subject to corruption. 
Their institutional systems are immature with limited transparency and official 
accountability. 
In a host country context of this nature, Chinese firms may be able to benefit from 
understandings they and/or their government makes with local politicians.  In reaching such 
understandings, they may be prepared to overlook local governance practices at which 
investors from western countries would probably baulk or be prohibited by their host country 
laws from participating in. The Chinese embassy, specifically its economic section, is 
typically the most important contact for Chinese investors.  In Zambia for example, ‘investors 
get advice on investment options and crucial support to establish contacts with Zambian 
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authorities and the Zambian elite.  The Embassy is the extended arm of the Chinese political 
leadership and it is directly involved in investment negotiations’ (Bastholm & Kragelund 
2009: 126). However, while Chinese investors may reach accommodations with category D 
host countries more easily than those from some other countries, the institutional capital that 
is built up can fall foul of political instability and thus prove short-term and vulnerable.  As 
Zheng Chao, commercial counsellor at the department of outward investment and economic 
cooperation at the Ministry of Commerce admitted, the prospects for Chinese OFDI in Africa 
are ‘not as good as expected’, because of political instability (China Daily, June 5, 2011).  
The availability of trained and disciplined local personnel in sub-Saharan Africa is often 
limited. For this reason, Chinese OFDI there is frequently accompanied by a heavy 
deployment of Chinese managers and workers.  It has been estimated that there may be 
around one million Chinese personnel working in Africa (van Dijk 2009).  Limited local job 
creation is one of a number of factors that have given rise to local criticism. Among others 
are reports of slack safety standards and the harsh treatment of African labor (for instance in 
Zambia), and a limited participation of African partners and of technology and knowledge 
transfer despite professions to the contrary (van Dijk 2009).  Smaller private Chinese firms 
compete with local firms in sectors such as plastics goods and textiles.  For their part, 
Chinese personnel complain of high personal security risks and arbitrary treatment by 
officials in countries such as Angola (Faucon & Su 2010). The latter problem has been 
attributed to the institutional immaturity of the country:  
‘According to human rights group Amnesty International, [the] law “is vague and does 
not enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is unlawful. It basically 
means that any act which the authorities say is a crime will be a crime even if this was 
not stated in law at the time the act was committed’ (Faucon & Su 2010: 14) 
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The stock of Chinese OFDI in sub-Saharan Africa remains below that invested in Asia 
and Europe but it is growing steadily. South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia and the Congo DR have 
received the largest amounts.  The Chinese policy that accompanies this investment has 
attracted considerable attention, partly because China is seen as replacing the former colonial 
powers as the major influence in the region.  This new ‘Beijing Consensus’ contrasts with the 
Washington Consensus enunciated by Ronald Regan and Margaret Thatcher (see Table 1). 
Under the Beijing consensus, the Chinese government plays a leading economic role.  In 
return for not imposing conditions for the soft loans that it is prepared to offer African 
regimes, the Chinese authorities negotiate to pave the way for Chinese companies to have a 
free hand to import their own staffs and apply their own practices and technology, with little 
transfer of knowledge and experience taking place.  
 
Table 1. Economic implications of 
Washington versus Beijing Consensus
Washington consensus Beijing consensus
1. Free markets and important role for the 
private sector
2. Loans but under strict conditions
3. Projects: use local companies to create 
employment
4. Transfer of technology, knowledge and 
experience (capacity building)
1. Important role for the government in the 
economy
2. No conditions for soft loans
3. Use Chinese companies, employment 
and technology
4. No transfer of knowledge and 
experience
Source: van Dijk, M.P. (ed.) 2009. The New Presence of China in Africa. Amsterdam
University Press: 22.
 
Chinese OFDI in Africa has become a politically sensitive issue which has provoked a 
debate over whether the Chinese contribution to African economic development is more 
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effective than that from the West.  Critics point to the limited creation of new local 
employment and the low transfer of technology as negative aspects of Chinese OFDI. The 
tendency for Chinese firms investing in Africa to import their own resource capital by relying 
on their own staff, technology and practices to a greater degree than is found, say, in category 
A host countries, raises the wider question of how host context is relevant for firm-level 
staffing and practices. 
 
Implications of host country contexts for Chinese firms 
In the case of China, some home country features are CSAs that nearly always translate into 
firm-specific advantages (FSAs).  The provision of low-cost finance and the overcoming of 
intermediate-level market imperfections such as in the provision of working capital, are 
examples. In the area of technology and managerial expertise, whether Chinese firms have 
FSAs or firm-specific disadvantages (FSDs) depends largely on the host country context. We 
have noted that Chinese FSAs are high for OFDI into most other emerging economies, which 
is partly due to the CSAs on offer to those firms that invest abroad in accordance with official 
guidelines.  These CSAs can include provisions for asset security and stable operating 
conditions that are negotiated between the Chinese and local governments. In other words, 
the Chinese authorities may be able to negotiate institutional capital for their overseas-
investing firms. Other FSAs include the familiarity of Chinese executives with characteristics 
common to emerging countries such as high levels of political intervention and an imperfect 
institutional environment, and how to negotiate necessary arrangements under such 
conditions.  In the case of many host developing countries, Chinese firms will also possess 
superior managerial and technical expertise compared with local human resources.  This 
contrasts with the situation Chinese firms experience when investing into developed 
economies, where they have FSDs in terms of their managerial and technical quality. They 
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will also lack appropriate institutional capital and if they are closely identified with the 
Chinese government they may suffer a considerable country-level disadvantage (CSD) as 
well. The question therefore arises as to what these contrasts between developed and 
developing host country contexts imply for the institutional and resource capital required to 
support OFDI.   
 
Chinese OFDI practices in developed economies 
Chinese firms investing in contexts such as the United States, located in category A of Figure 
2, have several FSDs with respect to institutional and resource capital.  Their executives who 
are seconded from their home base will usually be unfamiliar with the different embedded 
rules, norms and thinking of institutions in the host country (Scott, 2001).  Their customary 
ways of approaching officials, which will probably be grounded on an experience of informal 
relationship management based on guanxi, may prove to be counterproductive in a context 
where there is an insistence that formal procedure be strictly adhered to.  Their institutional 
capital is therefore limited.  In these circumstances, Chinese firms have to adapt to local 
institutions and may need to employ local managers and staff. Equally, the value of their 
resource capital may be limited by unfamiliarity with market expectations, managerial styles 
and organizational practices in the local context.  
The findings from Guo’s (2008) detailed case studies of three British subsidiaries of 
Chinese MNCs are consistent with this analysis.  He found that the MNCs absorbed local 
marketing practices through granting a high level of autonomy to their UK subsidiaries and 
appointing British managers to run them.  As part of the same investigation, Guo also studied 
three UK subsidiaries in China and found that, by contrast, they employed expatriate 
managers and applied British marketing practices.  He concluded that the reason for this 
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difference in mode of adaptation lay in the conjunction of FSAs/FSDs with the characteristics 
of the local context.  The British firms possessed FSAs in terms of advanced practices, and it 
was appropriate for these to be applied, with the support of suitably experienced staff, in a 
developing country context.  Indeed, they were officially welcomed as part of China’s 
catching-up process. By contrast, when firms like the Chinese ones with branches in the UK 
suffer from FSDs in terms of expertise and knowledge, those weaknesses would place them 
at a disadvantage in a developed country context unless they compensated for this by 
appointing local staff with the experience to apply appropriate practices. 
Chinese manufacturing MNCs, such as Haier, Huawei and Lenovo operating in 
developed countries (category A of Figure 2) have recruited senior Western managers to 
liaise with local institutions (some of which may also be prospective customers) and to 
introduce Western know-how and practices. They have also established R&D centers in 
western countries.  Haier appoints local managers to run its marketing and regional 
subsidiaries. In the case of Huawei, it was recently announced that the ‘world's second-largest 
network equipment maker aims to expand its footprint with more global hires’ (Reuters 
2011). In 2011 it hired, John Suffolk, a former chief information officer of the British 
government who was tasked with refining the company's cyber-security systems and reported 
directly to Huawei’s founder and chief executive Ren Zhengfei.  Lenovo, following its 2005 
takeover of IBM’s PC division, initially appointed an American CEO and made English the 
corporate language. As one commentator put it, ‘[Lenovo chairman] Liu wisely accepted that 
his Chinese colleagues were not prepared to run a global corporation by themselves, and he 
integrated the IBM veterans into the company's senior ranks’ (Schuman, 2010). In the event, 
internal conflicts ensued and in 2009 the American CEO was replaced by a senior Chinese 
executive of long-standing in the company; other senior executives also left the company.  
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One has to be careful, however, not to ascribe these adjustments of personnel and 
practices among Chinese firms investing in developed (category A) countries just to 
differences in country contexts that cause the firms to lack human resource FSAs.   Chinese 
companies investing in developed countries tend to share a number of common features, all 
of which mean that they need to take on human competencies additional to those they already 
possess.  They typically invest through acquisition of a developed country company, which of 
itself means that they have to secure a level of managerial legitimacy and deploy managerial 
skills that are appropriate to maintaining the value of the acquired company.  Many of the 
Chinese investing companies are seeking to compete in the developed markets they enter, 
requiring the ability to employ suitable marketing and distribution methods.  For this they 
also require world-class technologies and the search for these is often the prime motive for 
their acquisitions. As Chinese firms expand globally, so they also have to attain the 
competence to run global businesses, manage global supply chains, compete in sophisticated 
markets, and run an increasingly complex organization so as to benefit from dynamic 
capabilities.  All these factors require resources which even large Chinese firms may still 
lack, and they are particularly challenging for those Chinese firms investing in developed 
economies.  It is not surprising therefore to find prominent examples where, although their 
top management remains Chinese, they hire foreign executives and adapt to local business 
norms and practices. 
 
Chinese OFDI practices in developing economies 
There is a contrasting mode of adaptation when Chinese firms operate in host environments 
where institutional norms are weak and local competencies are lacking. In such cases, their 
most important institutional capital may lie in the influence that Chinese government 
agencies can exert over host country governments.  The ensuing understandings may permit 
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Chinese firms to compensate for resource deficiencies by introducing their own resource 
capital.  As a result, they often rely on their own indigenous Chinese human resources.  Thus, 
in sub-Saharan Africa, many Chinese firms employ their own staff, even manual workers, 
and appoint Chinese managers who apply Chinese work practices. Partly as a consequence of 
these practices, some Chinese firms isolate their personnel from local communities and 
transfer relatively little knowledge and practice to their African hosts.  There have been 
complaints that Chinese firms employing local workers do not comply with local laws 
designed to protect the environment and labor, especially if they are private firms beyond the 
direct influence of the Chinese state (van Dijk, 2009). There is some debate about the exact 
conduct of Chinese firms in Africa ─ the relatively optimistic view expressed by Brautigam 
(2010) contrasts with some of the conclusions reached in van Dijk (2009) ─ and evidence is 
limited by Chinese secrecy on the matter.  However, it seems clear that in the category D host 
contexts that some African countries exemplify, Chinese OFDI tends to be accompanied by 
far less acceptance of local practices than is the case in category A contexts.  The sector again 
may also have some relevance to this conclusion.  Many of the Chinese firms investing in 
category D countries are extractive or are producing low technology products using local 
materials.  This means that they do not require the managerial and technical competencies to 
sell technically advanced products to sophisticated markets or to operate global supply 
chains. They can therefore rely more readily on their own Chinese practices.  
 
Discussion 
Figure 3 summarizes the analysis offered in this paper. In comparing three broad categories 
of host country for Chinese OFDI, the figure identifies levels of relevant institutional and 
resource capital likely to be available from domestic sources, including the firm’s own 
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capabilities and Chinese government agencies. It suggests that host countries falling into 
category A of Figure 2 with high political stability (especially based on a democratic system) 
and mature institutions including markets, will present Chinese firms with the greatest 
institutional and resource challenges.  Considerable learning will be required in order to relate 
to host institutions in ways that are regarded as legitimate, as well as to develop effective 
marketing practices. Moreover, the contrast between home and host political systems stands 
in the way of achieving inter-governmental understandings and tends to render Chinese firms 
with close ties to government vulnerable to accusations of threatening national security.  The 
characteristics of these host countries turn existing Chinese country and firm-level attributes 
into disadvantages rather than advantages.  
By contrast, when host countries have stable centrally-controlled political regimes 
(category B in Figure 2), there is usually more scope for Chinese governmental authorities to 
provide institutional capital on behalf of their firms investing in those countries.  Moreover, 
the firms’ existing institutional and resource capitals are likely to be better suited to the host 
environment than is the case with category A countries. Host countries falling into category 
D of Figure 2 present a greater risk of political uncertainty and are also generally contexts 
requiring the greatest importation of resource capital in the form of personnel, practices and 
technology.  The degree and type of firm-level learning and adaptation that Chinese-investing 
firms require follows from these contextual situations, though it may be moderated by what 
the firm has already gained through previous experience and investment. 
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Figure 3.  Chinese OFDI: host country categories, capital availability and required firm-level adaptation 
 
 
Category of host country for 
Chinese OFDI 
 
Appropriate capital available to Chinese overseas investing firms 
 
Firm-level learning and adaptation 
required Institutional capital Resource capital 
 
Host country is politically stable and 
institutionally mature [Category A in 
Figure 2] 
 
 
low 
 
low 
Need to acquire institutional capital 
by learning host country institutional 
and political rules, norms and values.  
Need to acquire resource capital by 
employing local executives and 
technical staff during learning period 
following market entry 
 
Host country is politically stable and 
institutionally less mature [Category 
B in Figure 2] 
 
 
moderate 
[some institutional capital provided 
by government to government 
agreements] 
 
moderate 
Some augmentation of institutional 
capital required involving adaptation 
to host country institutional and 
political rules, norms and values.  
Also some augmentation of resource 
capital required: Chinese personnel 
may have to provide training and 
supervision in early stages. 
 
Host country is politically unstable 
and institutionally immature 
[Category D in Figure 2] 
 
 
high 
[considerable institutional capital 
provided by government to 
government agreements] 
 
high 
Institutional capital supplied at 
governmental level. Limited need to 
adapt to local institutional and 
political rules, norms and values, 
though disregard for them can cause 
public resentment. Also political 
instability may require periodical 
renewal of institutional capital. Need 
to supply resource capital supplied 
from China – may require 
importation of higher-level expertise 
as well as labour  
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Whetten (2009: 31) has observed that ‘the general sentiment among authors writing on 
this subject [China] is that the influence of context effects is too often unrecognized or 
underappreciated’. Our argument is strongly context-driven and assumes that ‘context 
matters’.  More precisely, the conjunction of political and institutional characteristics of home 
and host country contexts is seen to establish whether or not there is likely to be a deficit of 
the institutional and resource capitals that Chinese foreign-investing firms require. In order to 
understand both the ways in which Chinese OFDI is implemented and the conditions for its 
success, we have argued and illustrated that existing theorizing needs to be extended to take a 
fuller account of the diversity among relevant contexts.  
However, it is not only diversity at the country level that theory-building needs to take 
into account. At the firm level too, the considerable diversity among Chinese overseas-
investing firms is also consequential.  For it means they are not all similarly placed in relation 
to their contexts.   Diversity in the ownership of Chinese firms has implications for the extent 
to which their OFDI enjoys a CSA in the form of support from home government agencies 
and the control that government exercises over them. Both support and control tend to be 
stronger in the case of SOEs.  The industrial sector to which the outward-investing Chinese 
firm belongs will be also immediately relevant for the strategic and operational resources it 
requires, which raises the question whether these are already available to Chinese firms or 
available in the host country context.  If they are locally available, the economic rationale for 
investing via acquisition or a joint venture becomes stronger.  If they are not, investment in a 
wholly-owned Greenfield site accompanied by the importation of the firm’s own practices 
and personnel tends to be more appealing.    
While these firm characteristics are significant, it is now timely for the theory of FDI and 
globalization to broaden further beyond the heavy focus on the firm that it has displayed so 
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far, be this with reference to an MNC’s ownership and internalization of firm-specific 
advantages or to the LLL policies of catch-up ‘dragon multinationals’ (Mathews, 2006).  It is 
misleading to focus on firms as independent actors when in fact they operate within political 
and institutional domains that can both facilitate and hinder their internationalization.  
Although some firms may enjoy power in their environments sufficient to enable them to 
pursue their own preferred policies and practices (Child and Rodrigues, 2011), this is more 
likely in their home countries where they possess sufficient institutional and resource capital. 
In host country contexts, access to such capitals may be limited by political obstruction, such 
as protectionism and national security concerns, and by the unavailability of resources. It may 
be possible for financially strong firms to ‘purchase’ institutional capital and resources, but at 
a price which can include the risks of involvement in local politics and a backlash from local 
interests.  This has sometimes been the experience of Chinese firms in Africa. In other words, 
locational advantages (Dunning 2000) or host country CASs (Rugman and Li, 2007) may 
well incur transaction costs.  
This is not to deny that a firm may have acquired managerial competences and relational 
assets (social capital) valuable for internationalization through experiential learning and 
previous network-building. Rather it is to assert that the resources and practices it needs to 
apply to a foreign investment will depend on the relevance of that experience to the host 
country context, potentially mediated by political and institutional understandings (or 
misunderstandings) between the two countries involved.   
The implication of these observations is that theorizing on Chinese OFDI, and indeed 
OFDI from any national source, needs to be developed so as to explain and predict the 
variety of modes of engagement of investing firms with both host country firms and 
institutions.  It should take account of relevant political, institutional and capital (resource) 
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factors.  These include the role of the home government in negotiating ‘rules of the game’ 
with host national governments and institutions.  Here the fact that SOEs account for most of 
China’s OFDI is clearly significant, but this is not a feature wholly unique to China.  In the 
world as a whole, SOEs, account for about 11% of global FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2012: 99). 
Some of the understandings negotiated by host governments particularly on behalf of 
enterprises they own or sponsor will be intended to enhance firm-level FSAs and ease their 
application within the institutional framework of the host environment.  An example is the 
negotiation of agreements with some host governments that Chinese firms will be exempt 
from rules that stipulate the localization of employment.   
The most important argument in this paper, and its primary contribution, is that in order 
to fully appreciate OFDI and its implementation, we require an analysis that is sensitive to 
both home and host country contexts, taking account of the ‘triangle’ of resource, 
institutional and political factors that apply in those contexts.  This means that we have to 
draw upon insights from resource-based, institutional and political perspectives 
simultaneously.  As we have illustrated, it is a recognition of the different combinations of 
home and host country characteristics that permits an adequately nuanced understanding of 
the challenges facing Chinese overseas-investing firms and how they are likely to cope with 
them.  An analysis of home-host country contextual similarities and differences opens the 
door both to more adequate theorizing as well as to a better understanding of policy options 
for ensuring that foreign investment is successful.  
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